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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a civil action in which plaintiff-appellant
and defendant-respondent each seek to quiet title in themselves
to certain real property located in Uintah County, State of
Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

On October 31, 1979, the Honorable George E. Ballif
entered a preliminary ruling granting defendant-respondent's
motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. In
its ruling, the court held that there were no "issues of
material facts" presented by the pleadings, exhibits,
affidavits, depositions, and other documents submitted.
144) •

(R.

The ruling was based upon the court's conclusion that

the transaction between the parties was a sale and not a
mortgage. (R.144)
The court stayed entry of an order pending an oral
hearing and invited plaintiff-appellant to submit "additional
affidavits or objections to any of the evidence the court has
considered."

(R. 145)

In the two and one-half month interim

between the court's preliminary ruling and oral argument
plaintiff-appellant failed to produce any additional exhibits,
affidavits, documents, or depositions, and offered no
objections to the facts in the record.

-1-
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On February 16, 1979, the court issued a further
ruling concluding that summary judgment should be granted in
favor of defendant-respondent.

On April 2, 1979, the court

entered its final order granting defendant-respondent's motion
for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint and quieting
title in defendant-respondent.

(R.154-55).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-respondent seeks a decision of this court
affirming the order of the district court granting summary
judgment in its favor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 28, 1977, plaintiff-appellant,

w.

M.

Barnes Company (hereinafter "Barnes"), filed a complaint
against respondent, Sohio Natural Resources Company
(hereinafter "Sohio"), seeking to quiet title in certain real
property located in Uintah County, Utah.

The property

comprises approximately 5, 000 acres of mining leases, patented
and unpatented mining claims and water rights in what is known
as the Asphalt Ridge (hereinafter "Asphalt Ridge").

Sohio

thereafter counterclaimed to quiet its title in the same
property.
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As of October 6, 1971, the property was owned by
Barnes (37 1/2 percent), City Investing, Inc. (18 3/4 percent),
Tarinc, S.A., a Panama corporation (18 3/4 percent), and Sohio
(25

percent).

(R. 70-78).

On that day, all four owners entered into an operating
agreement in Cleveland, Ohio, designating Sohio as operator of
Asphalt Ridge.

(R.70-78)

Contrary to the statement in Barnes'

brief, this agreement specifically provided that it did not
create a trust relationship between the parties.
While in Cleveland, Mr.
"Mr.

w.

(R. 75).

M. Barnes (hereinafter

Barnes"), President of Barnes, also sought to borrow

$500,000 from Sohio for use in a venture unrelated to Asphalt
Ridge.

Mr. Harry Pforzheimer, Vice-President of Sohio,

informed Mr.
business.

Barnes that Sohio was not in the lending

(R. 42:

29; R. 100).

However, Mr. Pforzheimer

stated that Sohio was interested in purchasing Barnes' interest
in Asphalt Ridge and that an agreement to do so might assist
Mr. Barnes in obtaining a loan of the money he needed from a
bank.

(R. 42:28-29; R. 100).
On the strength of Sohio's agreement to buy Barnes'

interest for $500,000, the National City Bank of Cleveland
(hereinafter "Bank") agreed to loan Barnes $500,000.

If Barnes

defaulted on its promissory note with the Bank, Sohio was
obligated to purchase Barnes' interest and remit the purchase
price to the Bank.

(R. 43 :D-3; 90).

The transaction

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

became embodied in two agreements, each dated October 7, i

971

involving Barnes, Sohio and the Bank, as escrow agent.

The

first agreement was a letter agreement between Sohio and

aarnes

which contained an irrevocable promise by Sohio to purchase
Barnes' interest in Asphalt Ridge for $500,000.

(R.

43 :D-2;

79-80).
The letter agreement provided (1) that Barnes could
elect to sell its interest to Sohio for $500,000 at any time
between October 7, 1971 and March 7, 1973; and (2) that Sohio
would have a first right of refusal if Barnes received another
offer on the property. In that event, Barnes would
notify Sohio in writing of the complete
consideration offered and the identity
of the offeror, whereupon Sohio shall
have a period of thirty (30) days in
which to advise Barnes in writing
whether it wishes to purchase Barnes'
interest upon the terms and conditions
of said offer.
(R. 43:0-2; 79-80).
Mr. Pforzheimer, Mr. Barnes and an officer of the

Bank

executed an Escrow Agreement in conjunction with the letter
agreement.

(R. 43 :D-3; 89-92). The Escrow Agreement provided

for the execution of a deed, entitled a "Conveyance and
Assignment", by Barnes conveying Barnes' 37-1/2 percent
undivided interest in Asphalt Ridge to Sohio. (R. 43: D-13;
85-88)

This deed was executed by Barnes on October 7, 1971,

and was deposited in escrow with the Bank.
Paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement outlined the terms
of a sale of Barnes' Interest to occur upon Barne's failure~
pay the note to the Bank:
In the event Borrower (Barnes]
fails to pay, on or before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
December 29, 1972, its indebtedLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

ness to Escrow Agent [Bank] in
the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($500,000)
together with all interest
accrued thereupon, it shall
be deemed that Borrower has
elected to sell to Offeror
[Sohio] the properties
described in the said Letter
of Commitment [letter agreement]
and Borrower hereby authorizes
and directs Escrow Agent
to notify Offeror not later than
January 5, 1973 that Borrower
has elected to sell to Offeror,
whereupon Of feror shall be
obligated as of delivery of
said notice by Escrow Agent
to purchase the properties
and pay Escrow Agent interest
on said indebtedness from
December 29, 1972 at the rate
of eight percent (8%) per annum
calculated on a 360 day basis.
(R. 43:D-3; 90).

The Bank then loaned Barnes $500,000 on a promissory
note due and payable on December 29, 1972.

Mr. Barnes, who was

experienced in borrowing amounts of this magnitude, has since
admitted that he understood these documents and was not acting
under any duress:

Q.
So basically, your answer is that
you knew what you were signing and under no
duress when you signed it and made the
agreement?

A.

Right.

(R. 42:33).
Q.
Mr. Barnes, this kind of thing
though was not new to you, borrowing from
banks?

A.
Being in business, no, we had
borrowed this kind of money many times.
(R.
42:36).
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In November, 19 7 2, the Bank sent Barnes a ma t uri· ty
notice stating that the entire balance on the note plus
interest was due December 29, 1972.

(R. 43:D-14; 95).

on the

latter date, Mr. Barnes telephoned the Bank to ask for a
thirty-day extension of time for payment.

Because of the terms

of paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement, the Bank was unable to
grant the requested extension.

Barnes' failure to repay the

loan on December 29, 197 2 triggered the sale of Asphalt Ridge
to Sohio.
In letters dated January 2 and 4, 1973, the Bank
advised Sohio and Barnes, respectively, that Barnes' failure to
retire the note on December 29, 1972 constituted an election by
Barnes sell the property to Sohio and that the Bank would
deliver the deed to Sohio upon payment of the purchase pr ice.
(R. 43:0-8; 96-97).
On January 2, 1973, pursuant to the Escrow Agreement,
Sohio paid the Bank $500,000 plus the accrued interest on
Barnes' note and received the deed.

Sohio later sold sixty

percent (60%) of Barnes' former interest in Asphalt Ridge to
other investors for sixty percent (60%) of the purchase price,
or $300,000.

(R. 102, 106).

In his telephone conversations with representatives of
Sohio and the Bank on December 29, 1972, and in the letter to
Sohio bearing the same date, Mr. Barnes, for the first time,
spoke of an offer to purchase Barnes' interest in Asphalt Ridge
which he claimed to have received from a company called
Prudential Fund.

(R. 42:52-54; 43:D-9; 111).

-6-

Barnes tried to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

persuade the Bank to grant a thirty-day extension on the
promissory note in order to allow Sohio the thirty days
required by the letter agreement in which to exercise its first
right of refusal.

By Mr.

Barnes' own admission, however,

until late in the day on December 29, 1972, at no time had he
made any attempt to tell Sohio or the Bank about another offer
to purchase.

(R.2; 42:53-54 43:0-9; 111; 114).

Such notice did

not come in time to allow Sohio the requisite thirty days to
consider the offer prior to the due date of the note.

The note

went into default; Sohio purchased Barnes' interest and the
late notice was without legal effect.
In other correspondence between Barnes and Sabio
during January, 1973, Mr. Barnes expressed his unhappiness that
the Bank had not extended the term of the note and that Sohio
had not allowed Barnes a "grace period" before purchasing the
property.

(R. 43:0-11; 114)

"mortgage" or "pledge".

Barnes made no mention of any

Sohio repeated its position that at

all times its intention had been to abide strictly by the terms
of the letter agreement, Escrow Agreement, and deed.

(R.

43 :D-12; 116-17) •

Although Barnes now claims that it "mortgaged", rather
than sold, Asphalt Ridge, it was not until December, 1977, when
this suit was filed, that Barnes took any further interest in
the property.

(R.103).

Barnes made no attempt to complete the

sale to the purported offeror, Prudential, after Sohio acquired
the deed.

(R. 42: 62-63, 71-72).

-7-

Although Barnes knew that
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work was being performed on the property during the five
ensuing years at substantial expense to Sohio and others,
Barnes did not object or participate in those activities or
offer to pay for any share thereof.

Although Barnes had

previously paid its share of development expenditures,
assessment costs, and taxes on the property, it paid for
nothing after December 29, 1972.

(R. 103, 110, 122).

Not until late 1977, when Sohio sought Mr. Barnes'
acknowledgement of the deed, did Barnes exhibit any interest in
the property.
thereafter. 1

(R. 103).

This suit was filed by Barnes shortly

ARGUMENT
I

THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS FULLY
CONSIDERED AND COMPORTS WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The basic and controlling consideration in a summary
judgment proceeding is to look beyond, search out, and pierce
the pleadings to determine whether a genuine issue of materitl
fact exists between the parties. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d
1266, 1267-68 (Utah 1976)

~

Larsen v. Christensen, 443 P.2d

1 Mr. Barnes has since acknowledged the deed in sworn
testimony. (R.42:67). Contrary to what Mr. Barnes says, ~here
is no evidence in the record that Sohio has not recor~e~ i~f
deed. The deed was, in fact, recorded prior to the filing
this action.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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402, 403

(Utah 1968); Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 636 (Utah

1960) •

The submissions, i.e., affidavits, documents,
depositions, and pleadings are to be carefully considered by
the court in the light most favorable to the losing party.

v. McGovern, supra at 1268;
403.

!li.£!l

Larsen v. Christensen, supra at

When all the evidence, considered as a whole, fails to

establish a genuine issue as to any material fact, or any right
of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to grant the motion
for summary judgment.

Larsen v. Christensen, supra at 403.

Summary judgment

• . • does have a useful and salutary purpose. When the evidence as
contended by the plaintiff, and
every reasonable inference that
fairly could be drawn therefrom,
are considered in the light most
favorable to him, and it nevertheless appears that he could establish
no right to recovery, the motion
should be granted to save the time,
trouble and expense involved in a
trial.
Henri v. Washiki Club, Inc., 355 P.2d 973, at 973 (Utah 1960).
See also Harvei v. Sanders,
Frederick Mai

&

534 P.2d 905, 907 (Utah 1975);

Co. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962).

The lower court's decision to grant Sohio's motion for
summary judgment was carefully and deliberately considered.

On

October 31, 1978, the court indicated a preliminary intention
to grant summary judgment, but stayed entry of an order until
Barnes could provide additional submissions and objections, if
-9-
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any, and be heard.

Barnes offered no further affidavits,

interrogatories, depositions, documents, or objections and on
January 12, 1979, two and one-half months later, the court
heard oral argument on Sohio's motion.

On February 16, 197 9,

the court issued a further ruling restating that Sohio's mot~
should be granted.

The court concluded that the instrumentof

sale in this case

. . . would not as a matter of law
permit an interpretation of
the transaction as a security
transaction contemplating foreclosure, rather than one of
purchase as is expressly provided
in the instrument.
(R. 152).
The actual order granting summary judgment and
dismissing the case was signed by Judge Ballif on April 2,
1979.
In its brief, Barnes asserts that summary judgment is a
harsh remedy and should be granted with caution.
the byword of the lower court in this case.

Caution was

It is clear that

the court concluded, as did this court in Allen's

Products~.

v. Glover, 414 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1966), that

(t] he trial judge not only can but should gra~t a
motion for summary judgment if he feels certain
that he would rule that way no matter what proof
a party could produce in support of his
contentions.
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After oral argument and a second look at the
undisputed facts of this case, the court below held that no
material facts were genuinely in dispute and that Barnes was
not entitled to the relief sought in the complaint.

This court

should affirm the summary judgment quieting title in Sohio.

II.

THE CONVEYANCE AND ASSIGNMENT FROM BARNES TO
SOHIO WAS AN ABSOLUTE DEED AND THE
TRANSACTION WAS A SALE.

A.

It is clear from the deed itself that the

transaction between Barnes and Sohio was a sale.

The deed

executed by Barnes on October 7, 1971, was entitled
"Conveyance and Assignment," and contained the following
language:

For valuable consideration •
M. Barnes Company • • .
does hereby convey, assign,
transfer, set over, release,
and quitclaim unto Sohio Petroleum
Company . • . all of its right,
title and interest in and to all
mining leases, patented and unpatented mining claims and water
rights located in the Asphalt
Ridge project.
(R. 85).

w.

Attached to the deed was a complete description of the
Property conveyed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The deed by Barnes conforms with the requirements ~r
a deed found at Utah Code Ann.

§ 57-1-13. See also

Real Property 1010-11 (Single Vol. Ed. 1968).

Powell or

----=...:;:;

Even in the

absence of acknowledgment or proof, it is clear that the deed
1

is valid and binding between Barnes and Sohio. Utah Code Ann. .1

'

57-1-6.
The deed was deposited in escrow to be delivered to Sohio
upon the occurrence of any of the conditions set forth in the
letter agreement or Escrow Agreement.

I
.

Such a conditional

1

delivery is entirely appropriate.
1029-30.

I

See Powell, supra at

The date the condition occurs is the date of delincy

I

and the deed becomes effective and binding on that date (in

.

this case January 2, 1973).

I

See Powell, supra at 1029-30.

Barnes does not contend that the deed is deficient in
any respect and the deed should be given the effect it was
intended to have by its own clear and unequivocal terms.
B.

Construing the deed together with the letter

agreement and the Escrow Agreement clearly and unambiguously
evidences the transaction between Barnes and Sohio to be a
~

It is clear that different instruments executed at the

same time are to be read together in order to ascertain the
intent of the parties at the time the deed was executed.
Smyth v. Reed, 78 P.478, 479 (Utah 1904).
§70A-3-119.

~

See also Utah Code

The instruments executed along with the

deed in the instant case include the letter agreement and the
Escrow Agreement.

Construed together, it is clear that these

instruments effected a sale of Barnes' interest in Asphalt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

Ridge to take place upon the occurrence of the following
events: (1) Barnes' failure to pay its indebtedness to the Bank
on or before December 29, 1972; followed by (2) Sohio's payment
of $500,000, plus interest, to the Bank.

It is by the

occurrence of these events that the sale between Barnes and
iI

I

I

Sohio actually took place, as required by the deed, the letter
agreement and paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement. (R. 43:0-3;
79-80; 85, 90).

Barnes' failure to pay the Bank constituted an

election by Barnes to sell and Sohio proceeded to acquire
Barnes' interest in the properties.

I

Sohio paid the purchase

price to the Bank, as escrow agent, and the Bank delivered the
deed to Sohio.
None of the terms in the deed, Escrow Agreement, or
letter agreement reveal or imply any intention by either party
to enter into a mortgage.

Considered together, the terms of

these instruments are not ambiguous and extrinsic evidence may
not be resorted to in order to vary them.
58 P.2d 24, 32 (Utah 1936);

See Brown v. Skeen,

Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 946

(Utah 1933); Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah
1932) •
C.

The presumption that the transaction was a sale

can only be overcome by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence which proves that both parties intended a mortgage.
The language of the deed speaks as an absolute conveyance.
There arises, therefore, a strong presumption that the
written terms express the intention of the parties.

In

the case of Ewing v. Keith, 52 P.4, 5 (Utah 1898) the
-13-
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Utah Supreme Court made it clear that in an action to
declare a deed to be a mortgage
the burden rests on the moving
party to overcome the strong presumption
arising from the terms of the written
instrument, by clear, unequivocal, and
convincing testimony; and if there is
a failure to overcome this presumption
by testimony clear, plain and
convincing, beyond any reasonable
controversy, the written instrument
will be held to express the intention
of the parties.
See also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158
(Utah 1976); Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey,
143 P.283, 287 (Utah 1943); Smyth v. Reed, supra; Chambersv.
Emery, 45 P. 192, 195 (Utah 1896) 3 Powell on
Real Property p.447 (1977) .Furthermore, a deed may not be
considered a mortgage unless and until it can be shown that
both parties regarded it as a mortgage.
Walker Bank

&

In Northcrest, Inc. v.

Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1952), this

court stated:
Plaintiff maintains further that
whether an instrument is a deed or
mortgage is a matter of the
intention of the parties, and that
it must appear not only that one
but both parties regarded it as a
mortgage before it is such legally.
There is no doubt that this is so.
(Emphasis added).
See also Ideal Electric Co. v. Willey, 435 P.2d 921, 923 (Ut~
1968); Rizo v. MacBeth, 398 P.2d 209, 212 (Alas. 1965) cited
with approval in Kjar v.

Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972).

-14-
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In the instant case, there is nothing on the face of
the documents which lends itself to a mortgage construction.
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that Sohio has never
considered the transaction to be a mortgage. From the very
beginning Mr. Pforzheimer, Vice President of Sohio, indicated
to Barnes that Sohio wanted to purchase the Asphalt Ridge
property.

Sohio has always acted consistent with that

intention.

Barnes has never suggested, let alone offered any

proof of, the contrary.

Therefore, even assuming Barnes'

secret intention was as Mr. Barnes now states it to be, as a
matter of law, the necessary union of intention to regard the
transaction as a mortgage cannot be proved.
Based upon the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits on
file herein, it is apparent that even if a sale were not clear
from the terms of the documents, the transaction was a sale
based upon Barnes failure to allege facts sufficient to
establish a mortgage.
D.

The acts of the parties confirm that the

transaction was a sale rather than a mortgage.

Such

evidence, albeit not itself determinative, has nevertheless
assisted courts in deciding whether a deed should be
declared a mortgage.
&

See, e.g., Thornley Land

Livestock Co. v. Gailex:, supra at 287.
In this case, it is clear that Mr. Barnes' eyes were

open when he executed the various documents in question.
He admits to having read and understood the documents and
acted free from any duress.

(R.42:33)
-15-
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to having previously negotiated and entered into many other
business transactions on a level comparable with this one.
(R.42:36).
Although Barnes claimed to have a bona fide offer
to purchase from Prudential Fund, Barnes made no attempt
to sell the property to Prudential when Sohio failed
to match the offer within the thirty-day period.

If the

transaction were a mortgage and the note had been assigned
to Sohio upon Barnes' default, as Barnes contends, Barnes
could be expected to complete the sale to Prudential
and pay off the note or redeem the property, as the
case may be.

More importantly,

Barnes ignored the property

for five years following the sale, while Sohio and the other
working interest owners managed, operated, developed and
the taxes on the property.

(R.103)

Although well aware

purchase and subsequent actions of Sohio consistent

pa~

of~

therewi~,

Barnes made no objection or contrary claim for five years
to this lawsuit.

(R. 42: 81-84;

103).

~~

Now Barnes belatedly

decides to reveal previously unknown intentions which are self
serving and contrary to the language of the writings,

sayi~

that he "did not catch the significance" of that language and
that he "missed it" at the time he signed the agreements.
(R. 42: 38-39).
Sohio's actions have always been fully consistent
with ownership.

Sohio has never had any reason to treat the

transaction as anything but a sale and has never done so.
Since the purchase of Barnes' interest the property has
-16-
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been managed by Sohio with some participation by the other
owners, but with no participation by Barnes. (R. 103).
without protest from Barnes, Sohio has conveyed sixty
percent of the interest acquired from Barnes to its remaining
partners, Tarinc, Inc., S.A. and City Investing Co., for
sixty percent of the price Sohio paid for Barnes' interest.
(R. 102; 106-107).

Sohio has also entered into new

arrangements for the development of the property (R. 102) and
has paid taxes and assessed expenses to other partners, but not
to Barnes.
The circumstances of this case may be likened to those
in Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra, where this
court stated as follows,
Defendant went into possession,
received the rents from the
property and paid the taxes
and expenses incident to its
operation. He made a sale of
some of the property, apparently
without protest from the plaintiff.
This situation continued for approximately
6 1/2 years from the time of the
execution of the agreement, or
approximately 5 1/2 years after the
one year period to 'redeem' had
expired, before plaintiff made
any move at all with respect to
the property or any obligation with
regard thereto. No interest was
paid during this period and the
parties did nothing which would
be inconsistent with the full
ownership of the property in
Gailey. Then for the first time
Plaintiff makes claim that the
deed absolute was in fact a
mortgage. • . • Viewing the situation
of the parties at the time and
their conduct since that time, the
-17-
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conclusion is inescapable that
the agreement was intended to be a
sale agreement with option to
repurchase within one year.
Furthermore, conduct of the parties
from the time of execution of the
deed until the time of filing of
this action indicates that they considered
the agreement an option to repurchase
and not a mortgage.
The undisputed fact of Barnes' subsequent inaction,
together with the actions of Sohio and the terms of the
documents themselves, indicate that the transaction was a 5 ~
and not a mortgage.

III

SINCE THERE WAS NO INDEBTEDNESS ON THE
PART OF BARNES TO SOHIO, THE TRANSACTION
CANNOT BE DEEMED TO BE A MORTGAGE.
The most important factor in determining whether a
deed absolute on its face is in reality a mortgage is the
existence of an indebtedness on the part of the granter to the
grantee, the payment of which is secured by the property.
According to the authorities, the absence of such indebtedness
demonstrates that the transaction was a sale.

In determining whether an abolute
conveyance is a mortgage, by far the
most important fact is whether there
is an indebtedness on the oart of
the granter to the grantee, left
unaffected by the conveyance. The
debt may either have existed prior
to the conveyance or have arisen from
a loan made at the time of the
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conveyance. The existence of such
an indebtedness is considered as
almost conclusive that the transaction
was a mortgage. Even if it is
legally possible to have a mortgage
without a personal debt, its absence
raises such a strong, natural inference
in this sort of case that the transaction
was a sale that it practically
establishes the point.
(Emphasis
added) .
IV American Law of Property 92 (1952 Ed.).

In Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, supra, this court
recognized that without a debtor-creditor relationship there
could be no mortgage.

There, the court, at 638, quoted with

approval the following paragraph from Jones on Mortgages, (8th
Ed.)

The existence of the debt is the
test.
There must be a debt
or there can be no security for
its payment. Hence, it is said
if there is no debt there can be
no mortgage.
See also Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey,
supra at 287 (Utah 1943); Smyth v. Reed, supra at 479.
Appellant claims that the deed was a mortgage to the
Bank

to secure the payment of the $500,000 promissory

note executed by Barnes in favor of the Bank.

Such a

claim ignores the fact that the grantee under the deed was
Sohio, not the Bank.

The Bank could never have foreclosed

on the property upon the failure of either Barnes or Sohio
to pay the note.
the Bank.

Therefore, the deed was not security for

As explicitly stated in the Escrow Agreement,

the security relied upon by the Bank to make the loan was
-19-
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the commitment of Sohio to buy out Barnes, the proceeds
to go to the Bank.
nothing.

Barnes and Sohio owed one another

Indeed, Barnes has never even claimed any

indebtedness between it and Sohio.

The essential element

of an indebtedness on the part of Barnes to Sohio is
lacking and without it there can be no mortgage.
IV.
SINCE THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR REDEMPTION, THE
TRANSACTION BETWEEN BARNES AND SOHIO IS A SALE.
In Gibbons v. Gibbons, supra at 107, this Court stated:
The right of defeasance of the title conveyed
that is the right to redeem the property, is,
essential element of a mortgage. Without the
right to redeem the property, the deed cannot
intended as a mortgage. Such right is not
conclusive that a mortgage was intended; but
without the right there can be no mortgage.
See also Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355, 357 (Utah 1963)

where the court held that the transaction was a sale, and n
loan "because no right was given to the sellers to regain t
property sold. •

"

No language in the letter agreement or the Escrow
Agreement would permit redemption of Sohio's title.

Once

Barnes defaulted on the note and Sohio paid $500,000, the s
was completed and the deed belonged to Sohio.

Barnes has n

claimed that the transaction contemplated a right of
redemption.

The absence of any right of redemption by Barr

evidences as a matter of law that the transaction between
parties was not a mortgage.
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t

v.
EVEN IF THE DEED COULD BE CONSTRUED
TO BE A MORTGAGE, THE PRESENT ACTION
IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
It is clear that the doctrine of laches is applicable to a
suit to have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage.
Since the appellant is alleging an equitable doctrine to
declare a deed absolute on its face to be a mortgage, the
equitable defense of laches is available to Sohio.
~'

Mortgages,

§

In 55

~

37, pp. 218-19, the following is stated:

Since it is only by the intervention
of equity that a deed absolute on
its face may be declared a
mortgage, the rule obtains generally
that equitable principles as to
laches and stale demands are
applicable to a suit to secure such relief.
There is, however, no fixed rule by which
to determine when there is laches
sufficient to constitute a defense.
Each case is determined according
to its own peculiar circumstances.
Although a mere delay short of
the period established by the
statute of limitations does not of
itself raise the presumption
of laches, it has been held that
relief may be refused in the case
of a stale demand independent of
the period fixed by the statute
of limitations, and this is
particularly true where the relations
of the parties have been altered
in the meantime.
The Utah Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine of
laches to refuse to construe a deed as a mortgage in the case
of Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra.

In Jacobson, the plaintiffs

filed suit to quiet title to property alleging that a deed
-21-
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executed in favor of the defendants was an equitable mortg~e
The deed had been given to the defendants when they provid~
funds needed by the plaintiffs to pay off a debt on the
property.

Following the deeding of the property to the

defendants in 1966, the defendants paid taxes, maintained the
premises, harvested crops, and sold some of the property.

It

also appeared that until the action was filed, the plaintiffs
did not believe that they owned the property in question.

As

consequence, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows, at
158-59:

Supplementing what has been said
above, there is also to be
considered the doctrine of laches.
That is, that a court of equity is
reluctant to reward a party who has
been dilatory in seeking his remedy.
As is sometimes said, equity aids
the vigilant. The requirement
that laches must involve a delay; and
also that because of the delay there
has resulted some disadvantage to the
other party, is met here. In addition
to the delay of eight years in bringing
this suit, circumstances have intervened
so that the delay has indeed placed
the defendants at a substantial disadvantage.
The father . • . has now passed away, so
his testimony as to his version of the
transaction is no longer available.
It is also shown that the property
greatly increased in value; and that
a portion of it has been conveyed to a
third party.
In the instant case, there has been a delay of five (5) years.
The property has increased in value, portions of it have been
sold and at least one person present at the time the documen~
in question were executed is deceased.

(R. 101),
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Furthermore

the nature of some of the properties, being unpatented mining
claims, requires constant vigilance on the part of an owner.
Where Barnes, a self-professed experienced and knowledgeable
oil lease operator, did nothing for five years which would be
inconsistent with Sohio's full ownership of the property and
where Sohio has so significantly altered its position in the
meantime, appellant's complaint should be dismissed as barred
by

the doctrine of laches.

VI.
THE CASES CITED BY BARNES DO NOT SUPPORT THE
PRESENCE OF TRIABLE FACTS OR THE EXISTENCE OF A
MORTGAGE IN THIS CASE.
Barnes has cited certain cases in which courts
received parole evidence in determining whether a deed absolute
on its face should be interpreted, instead, as a mortgage.
However, these cases do not require such a factual inquiry
where, as in the present case, the deed is accompanied by
contemporaneous writings exhibiting the intentions of the
parties.

Parole evidence may be allowed on occasion in

examining the intentions of the parties to a bare deed, but not
to vary the terms of a written contract which accompanies a
deed.

Barnes is attempting to do the latter here.

Brown v. Skeen, 58 P.2d 24, 32 (Utah 1956).

See

~,

Furthermore, such

evidence is immaterial where the necessary elements of a
mortgage are lacking anyway.
Barnes' description of the opinion in Duerden v.
Solomon, 94 P. 978 (Utah 1908), is misleading.

It is true that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

the court held that courts of equity will look beyond the ter,
of a bare deed to determine whether there is clear and
convincing proof that a mortgage was the object of the partie:'
in executing and receiving the deed.

However, there was no

dispute in that case that an indebtedness existed between the
parties and that the deed had been given to secure payment o!'
the indebtedness. 94 P. at 979.
lacking in the present case.

This essential element is

Barnes does not even contend tha:

there was, or is, any indebtedness between Barnes and Sohio.
Barnes was indebted to the Bank and the security for that
indebtedness was Barnes' note together with Sohio's promise to
buy the property and pay off the note in case of Barnes'
default.
Furthermore, there was no other writing to look to in
Duerden to ascertain the intentions of the parties.

In the

present case there are two contemporaneous written agreements.'
It was the content of these writings upon which Judge Ballif
relied in his ruling below.

No court is as free to examine

parole evidence where a written agreement accompanies a deed,
as where there is no such additional writing.
Finally, the receipts and book entries mentioned in
Duerden were not only parole evidence, but were also the
defendant- mortgagee's own records showing the plaintiff's
payments as loan interest, rather than rental payments.

They

were thus, in effect, admissions by the defendant that the deed
was a mortgage to secure repayment of a loan.

In the present

-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case Sohio has received no payments from Barnes at all and to
the extent Sohio's records reflect the nature of the
transaction at all, they show it to be a purchase. (R. 100-102)
Hess v. Anger 177 P. 232 (Utah 1918), also cited by
Barnes, is entirely inapposi te. In Hess there was "no
contention

. . but that the deed

was intended as a

mortgage" by both parties pursuant to an oral agreement.
at 233.

Id.

The sole dispute was as to the "nature and extent of

the indebtedness the deed was given to secure."

Id.

In the

present case there is no allegation of a parole contract, nor
any indebtedness and

~

has no relevancy.

In Corey v. Roberts, supra, relied upon heavily by
Barnes, the court at the outset distinquished that case from
the present situation by holding that in a case such as this it
is essential to determine

[w]hether or not there was a continuing
obligation on the part of the granter to pay the
debt or meet the obligation which it is claimed
the deed was made to secure • • .
Here there was no debt, hence there was no continuing
obligation.
In Corey the court held that a transaction involving a deed
was actually a mortgage relationship because: (1)

There was a

pre-existing debt which was not extinguished by the deed;
(2)The grantee paid nothing for the deed; (3)

The granter

remained in possession after the conveyance vested and retained
all the indicia of ownership; (4)

The granter had a right to
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redeem or "repurchase" the property;

(5)

Neither party

actually maintained that the deed was absolute, although it
purported to be such on its face;
and (6)

Income received on the property was applied by the

grantee to the grantor's loan account.
It is undisputed that none of these factors is presen'.1
in the instant suit.

Furthermore, there are contemporaneous

writings in this case, whereas there were none in Corey.
Therefore, Corey is good law on what constitutes a mortgage,
but is factually opposite to this case.
Brown v. Skeen, supra, is another case which is
factually self-distinguishing.

In Brown the court held that a

deed and written declaration of trust, construed together,
constituted a trust deed allowing a right of redemption and
having the same effect as a mortgage.
In the present case it is undisputed that the
contemporaneous agreements contain language denoting a sale,
rather than a declaration of trust or mortgage.
It is also important to note that Brown stands for th<
view that where contemporaneous written instruments accompany;
deed, the original intent of the parties with respect to the
deed may be ascertained through reference to such instrumenu,
and extrinsic evidence will not be allowed to vary the ter~~
the instruments.

Thus Barnes is attempting to do precisely

that which is prohibited

Nevertheless, Sohio contends that

even assuming the truth of Barnes' extrinsic factual

-26-
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assertions, there still is no genuine issue of material fact
and the case was properly decided as a matter of law.

See

Point II C, supra.
According to Barnes the decision in Thornley Land and
Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra, turned on a finding that it was
not "clear from the terms of the agreement whether or not there
was an obligation from plaintiff to defendant • • • existing
after the execution of the agreement."
brief on appeal, p. 13.

Id. at 287, Barnes

It is undisputed in this case that

there was no such obligation either before or after the
agreement, hence there has never been a mortgage.

It should

also be noted that in Thornley the court held that the
transaction was a sale.
Barnes erroneously states that in Gibbons v. Gibbons,
supra, the court held the transaction to be a mortgage.
contrary is true, Id. at 108.

The

More importantly, the first

thing that Gibbons teaches is that where a written contract
accompanies a deed, the question whether the deed was intended
by the parties to be part of a sale or a mortgage is one to be
decided as a matter of law by reference to the contract.
at 106.

Id.

Since the recitals in the Gibbons contract

demonstrated (1)

the absence of an indebtedness secured by the

deed {the deed was given to discharge an indebtedness, rather
than to secure one); (2) that the conveyance was to be
absolute; (3) a reservation of a life estate by the granter;
and (4) a right of sale in the grantee, the transaction was
held to be a sale.
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Each of these elements is also present in this ca Se,
With particular reference to factor (3), although no life
estate was reserved by Barnes, Barnes did reserve his interest i
during the term of the note.

Once the note expired without

payment, the sale of Barnes' interest took effect.

From that I

time forward Sohio enjoyed full ownership, including the right I
to sell, and in fact did sell portions of Barnes' former
interest to other parties.
In its discussion of Gibbons it is clear that Barnes
has confused the parties, and perhaps the cases as well.
Barnes seems to argue that the court held the tr ans act ion to

be

a mortgage because the contract gave the granter a right to

i
!

sell the property to a third party.

Actually, the court found I

that the agreement "did not recognize a right of sale in the
granter."

On the contrary, the contract gave the grantee a

right of sale and the court held the transaction was a
conveyance.
Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972) is a case in
which the subject property was heavily mortgaged and the
mortgagor (plaintiff) had defaulted on his obligation and ws
about to lose his land.

In urgent need of money, the plaintiff'

was referred to defendants and an agreement was prepared
contemporaneous to the deed, whereby (1) the grantees agreed to
advance the money;

(2) the grantees agreed to reconvey to the

granter upon repayment of the indebtedness;

and (3) the

granter retained the right to sell the property to a third
party.

Inasmuch as these factors pointed clearly to a
-28-
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:

mortgage, the court remanded to the trial court for a
determination of whether the transaction was one actually
intended to disguise a usurious loan.

If so, the borrower

would have been entitled to the penalty provided under Utah
Code Ann.

§

15-1-7.

2

There is no dispute that the mortgage elements mentioned in
Kjar are lacking in the present case.

Rather than making out a

mortgage, the contemporaneous written agreements in this case
make out a sale.
Finally, Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355 (Utah 1963),
cited by the court in Kjar, is of interest because it held a
transaction to be a sale, rather than a loan, in the face of a
claim that the value of the property far exceeded the alleged
indebtedness (or, as the court stated, the purchase price).
This court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the buyers
because
[t]he only reasonable interpretation of the
transaction as evidenced by the written
documents, pleadings and pre-trial order based on
the discussion between the court and counsel was
that it was a sale and not a loan. This is so
because no right was given to the sellers to
regain the property sold upon payment of any
given amount . • . .

'

Id. at 357.

2
The procedural posture of the case on appeal is not
entirely clear, which leaves uncertain the exact purpose of the
remand. All parties apparently agreed that material questions
of fact existed which rendered the trial court's summary
judgment inappropriate. The nature of these factual issues is
not clear from the opinion. On appeal the defendantsrespondents merely asserted that the cour~ nonetheles~ did not
abuse its discretion in granting summary JUdgment. K1ar v.
Briml~, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972), at 24.
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Since there was no provision in this case for
redemption by Barnes once the sale occurred, the transaction
between Barnes and Sohio likewise cannot be considered a lo an,
regardless of the considerations raised by Barnes on this
appeal.
Although the law in the cases cited by Barnes does
apply in the present case insofar as there is an identity of
facts, that law supports Sohio's legal position, rather than
Barnes'.

The cases cited by Barnes which (1) interpret a

transaction as a mortgage; or (2) permit an inquiry into
extrinsic facts, are distinguishable on their facts.

In the

former cases there was an indebtedness, a right of redemption
and, in some of the cases, a contemporaneous writing (or oral
agreement) which constituted a mortgage.

In the latter cases

there was an absence of any written or oral agreement between
the parties other than the deed.

Here there are written

agreements evincing a sale and the absene of any elements of a
mortgage transaction and the lower court so held.

CONCLUSION

There never was any indebtedness between the parties in
this case and Barnes had no right of redemption after the sa~
took effect.

The absence of these elements is conclusive ~ocl

that there was no mortgage.

The agreements between the
-30-
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parties, together with the deed, demonstrate an intent by both
parties to enter into a sale.

What Mr. Barnes now says his

intentions were may not be allowed to vary the writings.

The

questions raised by Barnes in this case are immaterial in the
absence of the fundamental elements of a mortgage.
This court should affirm the summary judgment granted by
the district court.

There is no genuine issue of material fact

in this case and the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Sohio.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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